Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible Property in Eminent Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts by Mufson, Ellen Z.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 60 | Issue 2 Article 6
Spring 1985
Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible Property in
Eminent Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts
Ellen Z. Mufson
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mufson, Ellen Z. (1985) "Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible Property in Eminent Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 60 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol60/iss2/6
Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible
Property in Eminent Domain:
Focus on the Indianapolis Colts
INTRODUCTION
The sovereign power of eminent domain has troubled courts and com-
mentators because of its sweeping application and potential for abuse.' The
fifth amendment, which states, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation, ' 2 implicitly recognizes this power3
and purports to curtail its exercise, but the language of the amendment fails
to define precisely the bounds of the sovereign's reach. 4 Attempts to restrain
the condemnation power through stricter interpretation of the fifth amend-
ment's public use requirement have failed. The Supreme Court has effectively
eliminated public use as a check against condemnation by directing the
judiciary to defer to the legislature on this issue.' The effect of these decisions
1. "ITihe doctrine, that this right of eminent domain exists for every kind of public use,
or for such a use when merely convenient, though not necessary, does not seem to me by any
means clearly maintainable. It is too broad, too open to abuse." West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 545 (1848) (Woodbury, J., concurring and dissenting). "The power
of eminent domain claimed by the City [of Oakland] in this case is not only novel but virtually
without limit. This is troubling because the potential for abuse of such a great power is
boundless." City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 76, 646 P.2d 835, 845, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 683 (1982) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). "[S]o far as the federal
courts are concerned neither state legislatures nor Congress need be concerned about the public
use test in any of its ramifications." Comment, The Public Use Limitation On Eminent Domain:
An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 613-14 (1949).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. "[T]here is no express delegation of [eminent domain] by the Constitution; and it would
imply an incredible fatuity in the States, to ascribe to them the intention to relinquish the
power of self-government and self-preservation." West River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. (6 How.) at
532. "Neither the United States Constitution nor, as far as is known, any state constitution
contains any express grant of this authority. That explains why the courts have spoken of an
'inherent power.' " Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WAsH. L. REv. 553,
560 (1972).
4. "[Tihe term 'public use' defies definition." Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial
Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409, 410 (1983). The same is true for the term
"just compensation," as the Constitution does not supply a definition for what is just or how
compensation is to be measured.
5. Judicial deference is required because, in our system of government, legisla-
tures are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise
of the taking power .... Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are
substantial reasons for [condemnation], courts must defer to its determination
that the taking will serve a public use.
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (1984) (State of Hawaii used
condemnation to facilitate the redistribution of land ownership).
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may well vest the sovereign with a truly limitless power,6 unless some bound-
ary can be discovered which the sovereign may not cross.
One limitation on the power of eminent domain which has been implicitly
understood is that property must be within the sovereign's territorial juris-
diction before a taking can occur.7 This premise identifies perhaps the only
means by which the sovereign is prevented from overreaching. Few problems
are encountered in applying this rule to realty and tangible property. These
forms of property are either within or outside the sovereign's jurisdiction,
and such determinations are easily made. Property which is intangible, how-
ever, creates great difficulty in applying a territorial rule because of the
inability to ascertain the property's exact location. At the present time no
clear guidelines exist to provide rules for the exercise of eminent domain
over intangibles.8 While of minimal consequence in the past, the lack of
precedent in this area is causing conflicts in the present and may do so in
the future if a clear rule is not established.
The following discussion will explore the special problems of establishing
territorial limits of eminent domain over intangible property, using a current
controversy from the sports world as an illustration. Although the present
facts are specific to sports teams, the unsettled state of eminent domain law
may affect any business enterprise with intangible components.9 Attempts
by Congress to pass legislation for a sports problem 0 will thus affect only
6. "[P]ublic use has expanded to such a degree that it has become a meaningless restraint
upon the application of eminent domain." Note, Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are There
Limits After Oakland Raiders and Poletown?, 20 CAL. W.L. REv. 82, 103 (1983).
7. "There is one limitation upon the power of eminent domain which depends upon no
express constitutional provision. The powers of a sovereign state, however vast in their character
and searching in their extent, are inherently limited to the subjects within the jurisdiction of
the state ...... 1 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EmNrr DOMAIN § 2.12 (J. Sackman ed. rev. 3d
ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]. This implicit requirement is in contrast to the explicit
limitations of public use and just compensation.
8. Id. at § 2.1[2], states that intangible property is within the scope of eminent domain but
does not address the jurisdictional issues.
9. In Oakland Raiders, Chief Justice Bird, concurring and dissenting, posed the following
questions:
[I]f a rock concert impresario, after some years of producing concerts in a
municipal stadium, decides to move his productions to another city, may the city
condemn his business, including his contracts with the rock stars, in order to keep
the concerts at the stadium? If a small business that rents a storefront on land
originally taken by the city for a redevelopment project decides to move to another
city in order to expand, may the city take the business and force it to stay at its
original location? May a city condemn any business that decides to seek greener
pastures elsewhere under the unlimited interpretation of eminent domain law that
the majority appear to approve?
32 Cal. 3d at 77, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84 (emphasis in the original).
10. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), also known as the Professional Sports Team
Community Protection Act. This bill, introduced by Senator Slade Gorton, represents a recent
attempt to solve the problem by setting forth conditions under which sports teams may relocate.
The purpose of the bill is to provide stability and predictability in the location of professional
sports teams and to safeguard the equitable interests of communities which have supported
such teams. Id. at § 102. Senator Gorton previously had introduced a similar bill with the
same title. S. 2505, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). S. REP. No. 592, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. After the SENATE REPORT, however, no further action
was taken.
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one type of intangible and will fail to solve the underlying infirmity. A
better approach would be to develop a general rule of condemnation with
a focus on intangible property. Toward that end, this Note will first discuss
the extent to which intangible property is subject to condemnation. This
Note will then examine the jurisdictional rules for taxation, adjudication
and escheat, in search of precepts and practices which can be applied to the
condemnation of intangibles. This Note contends that the rule of mobilia
sequuntur personam," which locates intangible property at the domicile of
the owner, is the most logical and most practical rule for application in
eminent domain.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL SITUATION
The relocation of a sports franchise can be a disconcerting event for a
municipality. Sports teams, many valued in the millions of dollars,' 2 furnish
revenue and employment for their host cities. Cities often make financial
commitments in constructing, upgrading and maintaining stadiums through
long-term bond obligations.' 3 The loss of a sports franchise, especially one
which the fans have supported, is a blow to both the municipal pride and
pocketbook. A city faced with such a situation will attempt to preserve its
investment and future benefits. If negotiations fall, condemnation is a pos-
sible alternative.' 4
The particular difficulties in defining the jurisdictional limits of a sov-
ereign's condemnation power are illustrated through the actual relocation of
a sports franchise: that of the Baltimore, now Indianapolis, Colts.'5 In
February, 1984, the Baltimore Colts, a Delaware corporation' 6 and holder
of a National Football League franchise in Baltimore, Maryland, failed to
secure a new lease agreement with the managers of Baltimore Memorial
Stadium. The Colts' owner then began negotiations with the operators of
the Indianapolis Hoosier Dome. The Maryland legislature swiftly drafted a
bill enabling the Mayor and the City Council of Baltimore to acquire the
11. "Movables follow the [law of the] person." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 905 (5th ed.
1979).
12. See Football: Hit Behind the Line, Newsweek, Jan. 21, 1985, at 54-55.
13. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
14. See id. at 3.
15. The facts of the relocation are set forth in Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore,
741 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1753 (1985), an interpleader action
initiated by the Colts. The Seventh Circuit held that the federal district court in Indiana did
not have interpleader jurisdiction and vacated the orders of the district court which had restrained
the City of Baltimore from pursuing its condemnation action agailist the Colts. 741 F.2d at
955. The Seventh Circuit had decided earlier that the interpleader action was brought by the
Colts for the sole purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over Baltimore in Indiana. Indianapolis
Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 733 F.2d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1984).
16. Opposition to Motion to Remand at 1, Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Mayor of
Baltimore, No. B84-1294 (D. Md. filed June 7, 1984).
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Colts by eminent domain.17 Before the city could exercise its new authority,"
however, the Colts, "under the cloak of darkness," removed themselves and
their belongings beyond the Maryland state line, 9 leaving behind a multi-
million dollar training facility in Owings Mills, Maryland, title to which was
held by a subsidiary of the corporation.2" Undaunted by the relocation, the
City filed a condemnation suit to compel the Colts' return. 2'
The issue presented by this action is whether a municipality, as an agent
of the sovereign, may exercise its power of eminent domain to condemn a
sports franchise which, while still owning real property within the sovereign's
jurisdiction, has transported all of its tangible personalty beyond the sov-
ereign's territorial limits. Since the franchise, as an entity, is an intangible,
the main difficulty lies in determining just where the franchise was located
at the time of the suit. A related issue is whether the location of some part
of the franchise, in this case the real property, within a particular jurisdiction
is sufficient to subject the entire franchise to condemnation by that juris-
diction, or whether some part of the franchise is severable for condemnation
purposes.
The outcome of the case has broader implications than those which would
typically result from a dispute between a state and a property owner. Al-
though Indiana is not a party to the proceedings, the understanding is that
whatever property is not within the jurisdiction of Maryland is theoretically
condemnable by Indiana. As such, the instant case involves a potential
struggle between two states over their respective condemnation powers. Since
a basic premise of eminent domain law is that "[a] state ... cannot take
or authorize the taking of property or rights in property situated in another
state, and, conversely, each state holds all the property within its limits free
from the eminent domain of any other state," ' 22 the power to condemn is
exclusive. Only one state can prevail.
Resolution of the case is possible through one of three alternatives: either
the entire franchise is reachable and condemnable by Baltimore (the result
prayed for by the City); no part of the franchise may be taken by Baltimore;
or, only the real property within Maryland at the time of the suit may be
17. Indianapolis Colts, 741 F.2d at 955.
18. On March 30, 1984, the Mayor and City Countil of Baltimore approved a bill authorizing
the City to acquire all the rights of the franchise by purchase or condemnation. Baltimore,
Md., Ordinance 32 (Mar. 30, 1984). The City immediately filed a Petition for Condemnation
and for Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Case No. 84090060-L18657,
Mar. 30, 1984).
19. Indianapolis Colts, 741 F.2d at 955.
20. Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Remand at 9, Baltimore Foot-
ball Club, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. B84-1294 (D. Md. filed June 21, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Supplemental Memorandum].
21. The suit was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
as described in Indianapolis Colts, 741 F.2d at 954. The condemnation suit was subsequently
consolidated with two other related suits by an Order dated November 13, 1984, and bears the
Civil Action Numbers of B-84-1294, B-84-2026 and B-84-2560.
22. 1 NIcHoLs, supra, note 7.
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condemned by that jurisdiction.2 In advancing its argument, the City of
Baltimore has assumed that an intangible entity such as a sports franchise
is a proper subject for condemnation. Despite the bold assertion of the
sovereign's power, case law supporting the taking of this particular type of
property is not as clear as it is for the condemnation of realty and tangible
property. Before deciding how much of the property Baltimore may take,
a determination is necessary as to whether this intangible property is capable
of being taken.
II. Tm SPORTS FRANCISE AS INTANGIBLE PROPERTY: SUBJECT
TO CONDEMNATION BUT UNCERTAIN IN LOCATION
The conflict between the Colts and the City of Baltimore was preceded
by another sports franchise condemnation case-City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders,24 which involved an intrastate, not an interstate, move by a profes-
sional football team. Although the case has not reached final adjudication, 5
the California Supreme Court did determine that, subject to requirements
of public use, 26 a sports franchise, as intangible property, is condemnable.
Justice Richardson agreed with one treatise writer that " '[i]ntangible prop-
erty such as choses in action, patent rights, franchises, charters or any other
form of contract, are within the scope of' " a taking. 27 The court also noted
that neither the federal nor state constitution distinguished between tangibles
23. For the purpose of argument, this Note will not distinguish between the power of the
sovereign to condemn and the power of condemnation that the sovereign may confer upon a
city. The interests of the State of Maryland and the City of Baltimore will be considered
sufficiently merged as against the interests of the Colts and the State of Indiana.
24. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
25. The history of Oakland Raiders is set forth in the opinion of the California Court of
Appeals, City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983).
The controversy in the courts began when the City ot Oakland filed a condemnation suit
against the Oakland Raiders to prevent the team from moving to Los Angeles. A summary
judgment by the trial court dismissed the City's suit with prejudice. The California Supreme
Court reversed the summary judgment in Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, '183
Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982). That court held that the Raiders were subject to the power of eminent
domain, provided that the City of Oakland could show a public use for the taking. The
California Supreme Court then remanded the case to the trial court for a full evidentiary trial
on the merits in order to give the City the opportunity of showing a public use. When the
case was retried by the trial court, the trial was bifurcated to consider the Raiders' objections
to the taking separately from the issue of compensation. The trial court sustained five of the
Raiders' objections. The City then asked the California Court of Appeals to issue a peremptory
writ of mandate to the trial court, vacating the trial court's judgment on the ground that the
holding was contrary to the law of the case as established by the California Supreme Court
in Oakland Raiders. The California Court of Appeals granted the relief requested by the City,
ruling that the trial court had incorrectly sustained the Raiders' objections. The trial court was
then ordered to determine, without the taking of additional evidence, the remaining objections
submitted to it but not previously ruled upon.
26. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, the public use limitation
provides little protection against condemnation.
27. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 67, 646 P.2d at 839, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677, (citing 1
NicHoLs, THE LAW Or EMINENT DoMAiN § 2.112] (J. Sackman ed. rev. 3d ed. 1981)).
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and intangibles, 28 and that lack of precedent alone would not shield an
intangible from eminent domain. 29
The United States Supreme Court described the attempted distinctions
between tangible and intangible property as having "no foundation in
reason." 30 The Court held further that there was "nothing peculiar to a
franchise which can class it higher ... or render it more sacred, than other
property," and that although a franchise may be incorporeal, it "is property,
and nothing more."'" The inescapable conclusion is that intangible property
in general, as well as sports franchises in particular, are proper subjects for
the sovereign's taking power. Despite the Supreme Court's language, how-
ever, a difference does exist between the condemnation of tangible and
intangible property. The distinction is of enough significance to affect the
practical, if not the theoretical, aspects of eminent domain.
"[Tihe consequent cleavage between the rules of law applicable to tangibles
and.those relating to intangibles are attributable to the exclusive dominion
exerted over the tangibles themselves by the government within whose ter-
ritorial limits they are found."32 The singular difficulty with intangible prop-
erty is that it "has no physical characteristics that would serve as a basis
for assigning it to a particular locality. The location assigned to it depends
on what action is to be taken with reference to it.",33 "[Tihere is a tendency
both to confuse the legal relations comprising the franchise with the physical
properties and to leave unclear what and how many legal relations have
actually been considered. ' 34 The confusion in locating and defining intangible
property impedes the resolution of interstate condemnation conflicts. The
Oakland Raiders Court was able to dispose of the location issue because
the team's movement was contained within a single sovereign's territory. 5
With regard to the Colts, however, the federal district court must face the
issue squarely.
The Supreme Court, though it spoke of intangibles as being no different
from tangibles, did not reach the jurisdictional issue of the present action.
The Court did not consider situations where the intangible is severable from
other property and movable from one jurisdiction to another, or where the
intangible is associated with several jurisdictions at once. The intangibles
28. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 67, 646 P.2d at 839, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
29. Id. at 66, 646 P.2d at 839, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
30. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 534 (1848).
31. Id. See also Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (holding that,
in the temporary taking of a laundry business by the federal government, the owner must be
compensated for the going-concern value as well as for the value of the business); Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) (holding that, in the condemnation of a
lock and dam by the federal government, the company was entitled to recover for the taking
of the franchise to collect tolls as well as for the value of the tangible property taken).
32. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 364 (1939).
33. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 74, 646 P.2d at 844, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (quoting In
re Waits' Estate, 23 Cal. 2d 676, 680, 146 P.2d 5, 8 (1944)).
34. United States v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 168 F.2d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 1948).
35. See Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 74-75, 646 P.2d at 844, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
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under consideration were so closely associated with the fixed, tangible targets
of condemnation, that the Court had no need to ponder whether, for ex-
ample, the franchise to collect tolls on the West River Bridge would have
been condemnable by Vermont if the bridge had remained in Vermont, but
the toll-collecting franchise had somehow moved to Massachusetts.16 The
situs of a bridge or building is easily determined, but the location of an
enterprise which is incorporated in one state, has its headquarters in another
state, and does business in several states, is more difficult to divine.
The Supreme Court would seem to sanction the condemnation of a sports
franchise, but the Court's opinions are based on situations where an intan-
gible is the object of what might be referred to ds a secondary taking; the
intangible is merely associated with the tangible property sought by the
condemnor. In the condemnation of a sports franchise, the intangible itself
is the target of a primary taking.37 If such a taking were permissible, a
jurisdictional test would be necessary to determine the location of the in-
tangible in relation to the powers of the condemnor. The Court's decisions
in eminent domain do not assist in this task. The Court's decisions in
taxation, however, are considerably more helpful. Intangibles have long been
subject to taxation and, as a result, have required a designated location.
III. TAXATION: RULES AND RATIONALES FOR THE EXERCISE OF
JURISDICTION OVER INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
The exercise of a state's taxing power over property within its jurisdiction
is based on a belief that the owner of property secures the benefit and
protection of the laws within a jurisdiction which enable him to enjoy the
fruits of his ownership.3" The state is not acting unreasonably in exacting a
mandatory contribution, because "taxation is but a means of distributing
the cost of government among those who are subject to its control and who
enjoy the protection of its laws . . . ."9 The state may justify the tax by
showing a minimum nexus between itself and the targeted source of revenue, 40
but "no State may tax anything not within her jurisdiction without violating
the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 41 The rule for jurisdiction is clear: "[t]he power
36. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co., 338 U.S. 1; Monongahela Navigation Co., 148 U.S.
312; West River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507.
37. For example, some of the intangible rights targeted by Baltimore are, in addition to
the National Football League franchise rights: all contract rights, including those for personal
services; all licenses, easements, grants and negotiating rights; all indicia of ownership, including
shares of stock and general and limited partnership interests; and, "[a]ll other rights and
interests of any kind or nature whatsoever necessary and appropriate to the ownership and
operation of a National Football League professional football club .... ." Baltimore, Md.,
Ordinance 32, § 1 (Mar. 30, 1984).
38. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 364 (1939).
39. Id. at 370.
40. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980) (describing one
requirement for a state's taxation of income generated by a corporation in interstate commerce).
41. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 210 (1930).
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of taxation ... is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of
the State."' 42 "[Piroperty lying beyond the jurisdiction of the State is not a
subject upon which her taxing power can be legitimately exercised. Indeed,
it would seem that no adjudication should be necessary to establish so obvious
a proposition. '43 What is not obvious, however, is how the limits of that
jurisdiction are to be determined.
The rule for the jurisdiction to tax is most easily applied to real or tangible
property permanently located within a state. For these types of property the
power of taxation rests exclusively with the state in which the property is
located, regardless of the domicile of the owner.44 "Tangibles with permanent
situs therein ... may be taxed only by the State where they are found. 45
The rationale for this rule is that " 'such property is visible, easily found
and difficult to conceal, and the tax readily collectible .... " -46 The Court
speaks of such property as receiving its entire protection within the taxing
state. That state is then justified in exacting a cost in return for the benefits
incurred " 'irrespective of the domicile of the owner.' ,47
A jurisdictional rule for intangibles is more difficult to construct due to
the impossibility "of attributing a single location to that which has no
physical characteristics and which is associated" with more than one juris-
diction.48 Intangibles "have no situs in the physical sense, but have the situs
attributable to them in legal conception.' 49 In dealing with the jurisdictional
problems of incorporeal property the Supreme Court initially resisted the
idea of inheritance or property taxation by more than one state, and applied
the general rule of mobilia sequuntur personam to intangibles, permitting a
tax to be levied only by the state of the domicile of the owner.5 0 The theory
42. State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds (R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania), 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300,
319 (1872).
43. Id.
44. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 489 (1925); accord, Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 93 (1929); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194,
204 (1905).
45. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 280 U.S. at 211; accord, Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331
U.S. 486, 491 (1947).
46. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 16 (1928) (quoting Union Refrigerator Transit Co.,
199 U.S. at 206).
47. Blodgett, 277 U.S. at 16 (quoting Union Refrigerator Transit Co., 199 U.S. at 206).
48. Curry, 307 U.S. at 362-63 (regarding the imposition of transfer (inheritance) taxes on
a trust where decedent who created the trust was domiciled in one state and the trustees resided
in another).
49. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209 (1936). The Court sanctioned a West
Virginia ad valorem property tax on the corporation's accounts receivable and bank accounts
in other states. The Court reasoned that these intangibles had become localized in West Virginia
because all the corporate moneys and expenditures were directed by the corporation's office
in Wheeling, West Virginia.
50. See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1930) (referring to bonds which were
physically located in a state other than that of the owner's domicile); see also Farmers Loan
& Trust Co., 280 U.S. at 211 (regarding a testamentary transfer tax); Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 280 U.S. at 92 (holding that the owner of the trust was the trustee, as opposed to the
creator of the trust, and that the trust was domiciled only in the state of the trustee).
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behind the rule was that "[n]ormally the intangibles are subject to the
immediate control of the owner," and that "[s]ince the intangibles themselves
have no real situs, the domicile of the owner is the nearest approximation"
to their location.I Further, if the situs of documents representing intangibles,
(for example, bonds or promissory notes), were to be the controlling factor
in establishing jurisdiction, "their transfer to another jurisdiction would
defeat the tax of the domiciliary state, ' 5 2 and provide a possible means for
avoiding taxation entirely.
The rule of mobilia sequuntur personam provides a handy fiction for
establishing the location of intangible property for individuals, but it falls
short of a satisfactory solution for intangibles associated with business en-
terprises. To remedy this problem, the Court created an exception to the
general rule and acknowledged that intangibles " 'may acquire a situs for
taxation other than at the domicile of their owner if they have become
integral parts of some local business.' "I' Despite its efforts to avoid taxation
of intangibles by more than one jurisdiction, the Court eventually recognized
that intangibles associated with several states often create more than one set
of legal relationships. The Court was reluctant to say that the intangible
interests were linked more to one state than to another. 54 In such circum-
stances the Court finally decided that it could not justify the withdrawal
from one state of its power to tax,55 and held that due process of the fifth
amendment does not require the fixation of a single exclusive place of
taxation of intangibles.5
6
To summarize the foregoing discussion, the location of property for ju-
risdictional purposes of taxation is controlled by several precepts. The general
rule of mobilia sequuntur personam identifies intangible property at the
domicile of the owner and permits taxation of the property at that location.
An exception to this rule allows a jurisdiction to tax intangibles which have
acquired a business situs therein. A corollary would permit multiple taxation
of an intangible when it had established legal relationships with more than
one jurisdiction. Realty and tangible property remain taxable only by the
jurisdiction of their situs. Whether or not these principles, which are rea-
sonable for taxation, may properly be applied to condemnation depends
upon the extent to which the theories and practices of taxation are consistent
with those of eminent domain.
The greatest difference in existing rules between taxation and condem-
nation is that taxation by more than one jurisdiction is permissible, whereas
condemnation by more than one state is prohibited due to the exclusive
51. Greenough, 331 U.S. at 493; see Curry, 307 U.S. at 365-68.
52. Greenough, 331 U.S. at 492-93.
53. Wheeling Steel Corp., 298 U.S. at 210 (quoting Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 280 U.S.
at 213, referring specifically to choses in action).
54. Curry, 307 U.S. at 369.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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nature of the taking power. As long as a minimum nexus exists between the
jurisdiction and the object of taxation, a tax on the object is permitted even
if several jurisdictions exercise this power at once. On the other hand,
multiple condemnations of the same property, if permitted, would result in
chaos. Such a rule would needlessly encourage states to over-exercise their
power, as each state might condemn solely to prevent another from taking
an asset of potential value. The practice of multiple taxation would thus
seem to prescribe a less stringent and less mechanical rule in locating the
object of the tax than a rule of jurisdiction for condemnation.
Another difference between taxation and condemnation is that a taxpayer's
liability is predictable, whereas a condemnee's is not. The taxpayer associates
himself with a jurisdiction and theoretically obtains the benefits and pro-
tections of its laws. In return, the taxpayer contributes to the government
of the jurisdiction. 57 A taxpayer can thus ascertain his tax liability in advance
and can choose to move elsewhere if he deems the liability too high. By
contrast, in the operation of eminent domain, the condemnee can never
predict if or when he will be forced to surrender his property. Once a
condemnation action is adjudicated against him, a condemnee has no choice
but to accept monetary compensation, even though the property may have
a personal value in excess of that measured by the marketplace.5 8
In taxation, the taxpayer retains the use, enjoyment and benefit of the
taxed property, although he does relinquish control of other property (money)
as a condition for use within a particular jurisdiction. In eminent domain,
however, the property owner is forced to transfer title to specific property
to the jurisdiction in which it is located. He is therefore deprived of the
enjoyment of property which may be unique and which may have special
value to him.59 Finally, because the burden of taxation falls on nearly
everyone, taxpayers constitute a voting majority which can directly influence
their liability.6° Condemnees, however, are neither a majority nor a readily
identifiable entity.6' Even when they do unite, their number is often too
57. See cases cited supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
58. But see Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 597. Stoebuck asks if, in fact, owners do "attach
a unique, non-monetary satisfaction to the holding of specific property interests." He is not
certain. If this proposition were true, a "disfavored citizen could be punished and tyrannized"
by the power of eminent domain. Stoebuck concludes that "[any potential for harm is more
theoretical than real."
59. But see id. at 571-72. Stoebuck treats the money exacted by taxation in the same way
as the property taken through eminent domain, believing that taxation and condemnation are
merely different ways of exercising the same power. His view downplays the unique qualities
that some property possesses.
A sports franchise is a good example of property that may be unique, since a franchise
may contain athletes whose combined talents are so extraordinary that they produce a winning
team. Although, in theory, each team has an equivalent monetary value, at the time of a
condemnation, such a group of individuals may be irreplaceable.
60. Note, supra note 4, at 435.
61. Id. at 436.
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insignificant to have much influence on the government; 62 they are usually
too scattered by distance and time to affect the sovereign's choice of con-
demnable property. 63
The above differences between taxpayers and condemnees show that con-
demnees are at a distinct disadvantage in their relationship with the sovereign.
They suffer from uncertainty in knowing whether their property will be
taken, they have no choice but to surrender to a condemnation, and they
have little influence with the sovereign as a voting block. In the interest of
fairness, any rule formulated with respect to the condemnation of intangibles
should strive to achieve at least the same meager predictability which is
already associated with the condemnation of tangible property.64 In addition,
since only one jurisdiction can prevail in a contest over the condemnation
of a particular intangible, the victor should be required to assert not merely
a sufficient nexus between itself and the property, but a superior one.
The rule of mobilia sequuntur personam seems suitable for use as a
jurisdictional guideline in eminent domain. That rule permits predictability
because it locates an intangible at the domicile of the owner. In addition,
it theoretically relies on a superior nexus between the condemnor and the
property. As noted earlier, 6 the rule would assume that, since the owner of
an intangible exerts immediate control over it, the domicile of the owner is
the closest maintainable connection between the property and the condemnor.
The common law rule that an owner may have only one domicile would
satisfy the exclusive nature of eminent domain. 66 Alternatively, where intan-
gible property is inextricably associated with a business, the commercial
domicile exception would apply. As in taxation, realty and tangible property
would be severable from the owner and condemnable only where located. 67
The rule locating intangibles at the domicile of the owner, while useful
for taxation and adaptable to condemnation, is not the only way to determine
a sovereign's jurisdictional power. The City of Baltimore would borrow, not
from taxation, but from judicial jurisdiction and apply a minimum-contacts
test to eminent domain. An examination of this standard reveals its defi-
ciencies when used for condemnation, and demonstrates that what is rea-
sonable for one purpose may not be so for another.
68
62. Id. at 436-37.
63. Id. at 436.
64. Owners of tangible property at least know which jurisdiction may assert its taking
power.
65. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
66. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428-29 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice
Frankfurter went on to say that the common law rule often represents a fiction. Id. at 429.
For the purposes of eminent domain, however, the common law rule should be a reality. A
rule that permitted more than one domicile would violate the exclusivity requirement of eminent
domain jurisdiction.
67. In a case dealing with trust property, such as Curry, a court would need to decide
between the legal and the equitable owner for condemnation purposes. The formulation of
such a rule is outside the scope of the present discussion.
68. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORpORATiONs 149 (2d ed. 1970). Rules governing
jurisdiction tend to be based on "whether a state's contacts with a person, thing, or occurrence
are sufficient to make the state's action reasonable," id., but different states may have differing
standards of reasonableness for taxation, regulation or litigation purposes. See id.
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IV. THE MINIMUM-CONTACTS TEST FOR JUDICIAL JURISDICTION:
INSUFFICIENT CONTACTS FOR EMINENT DoMAIN
Baltimore advances two arguments for the assertion of eminent domain
jurisdiction over the Colts. Both arguments are based on the contacts between
the franchise and the State of Maryland. 69 First, the City asserts that the
team was present within Maryland for many years, pursuing the business of
the franchise;70 second, the City points to the Colts' continued ownership of
a multi-million dollar training facility which is located within the state. 7'
Baltimore claims that, notwithstanding the relocation of the franchise and
the purported establishment of a new principal place of business prior to
the condemnation suit, the team's past and present contacts with the con-
demning jurisdiction provide a sufficient basis to enable the City to force
the Colts to return.
The minimum-contacts test for judicial jurisdiction was established by the
Supreme Court as a way to determine whether a state could compel non-
resident parties to participate in court actions within its territory. The Court,
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,72 held that for a party to be subject
to a state's judicial jurisdiction, the party must have either actual presence
within the forum territory, or "certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' "-7 The Court, in Shaffer v. Heitner,74 reemphasized
the importance of minimum contacts: "[A] State . . . seeking to assert
jurisdiction over a person located outside its borders, may only do so on
the basis of minimum contacts among the parties, the contested transaction,
and the forum State."75 Referring specifically to corporate presence within
a state, the Court recognized that since the corporate personality was a
fiction, its "presence" could only be manifested by the activities carried out
on its behalf.76 A court would need to evaluate the "quality and nature"
69. This Note does not address the contention of the Colts that the City of Baltimore
cannot effect a taking outside its municipal limits, which would preclude the condemnation of
the training facility in Owings Mills, Maryland. Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion to Remand, at 20-21, Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No.
B84-1294 (D. Md. filed June 21, 1984). This discussion presumes that the City possesses the
power to condemn the franchise through the act of the Maryland legislature.
70. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand at 1-2, Baltimore Football Club, Inc.
v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. JH 84-1294 (D. Md. filed Apr. 4, 1984).
71. Id. at 2. The corporation might successfully maintain that it is a separate entity from
the subsidiary that actually owns the facility. This discussion will presume, however, that the
corporation itself owns the real property within Maryland.
72. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
73. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
74. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
75. Id. at 220 (Brennan, J., concurring in Parts I-III and summarizing the essence of the
majority opinion).
76. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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of these activities to determine whether the assertion of a state's judicial
jurisdiction would be contrary to the guarantees of due process.7 7
The justification for the minimum-contacts standard of judicial jurisdiction
is similar to that for the jurisdiction to tax.78 "[T]o the extent that a
corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it
enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of
that privilege may give rise to obligations," one being the duty to respond
to a suit in a state where corporate contacts were made.79 Despite the
possibility that a minimum-contacts test might compel the Colts to respond
to a suit in Maryland, the question remains as to whether such a standard
for judicial jurisdiction is proper for jurisdiction in eminent domain.
If a minimum-contacts test were applied to the taking of the Colts, a
court would inquire into the quality and nature of the contacts between the
property and the condemnor. The court would ask whether prior activities
in Baltimore and continued ownership of realty would supply a sufficient
connection for eminent domain. State long-arm statutes typically enumerate
specific types of contacts which subject an actor to judicial jurisdiction; 0
property ownership is a common example.8 ' In addition, the courts have a
long history of basing judicial jurisdiction on property within their territo-
ries. 82 Despite these factors, the Court in Shaffer held that ownership of
property, although satisfying due process requirements, was not decisive in
establishing judicial jurisdiction.8 3 If the outcome for this type of jurisdiction
is uncertain, the result in eminent domain must be doubtful as well.
One reason that the minimum-contacts standard for judicial jurisdiction
is unsuitable for eminent domain is that judicial jurisdiction is a non-exclusive
power. If individual or corporate activities span several states, those states
may assert their judicial jurisdiction simultaneously without offending due
process. Such is not the case in condemnation, as its power is exclusive. The
non-exclusivity of judicial jurisdiction, however, does not fully explain why
this standard is unsuitable. Jurisdiction for property and inheritance taxation,
as noted earlier,8 4 is also non-exclusive, yet its rationale is adaptable to
eminent domain. The distinctive characteristic, and the difference between
the powers, is one of timing.
A significant reason why the test for judicial jurisdiction will not work
in eminent domain is that the times during which these two powers may be
asserted are not the same. The standard of minimum-contacts is specifically
77. Id. at 319.
78. "The activities which establish [a corporation's] 'presence' subject it alike to taxation
by the state and to a suit to recover the tax." Id. at 321.
79. Id. at 319.
80. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CnM PROCEDURE § 12.14, 632 (2d ed. 1977).
81. Id.
82. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211.
83. Id. at 212.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
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designed as a test for judicial jurisdiction when parties to an action are non-
residents of a state. The test does not require that subjects of a state's
jurisdiction be within the state's territory at the time a suit is filed. Since
the focus of the minimum-contacts standard is on the quality, nature and
extent of the contacts, alleged contacts may be in the past, the present or
both. The only time-barrier to bringing suit is a statute of limitations.
Eminent domain jurisdiction, by implication, focuses on current contacts
at the time of a condemnation suit. The mandate that property be within
the jurisdiction of the condemnor carries with it the understanding that the
property is located there at the time the taking occurs. This is also true of
taxation, which is why the location of property is so important to ascertain.
If the targeted property were in another jurisdiction at the time of a taking,
the condemning state would be attempting to exercise its taking power in
another state. States could not engage in such extraterritorial action, because,
"any attempt to exercise governmental powers in another state is necessarily
void." 85
Using a minimum-contacts standard for eminent domain jurisdiction will serve
only to cause confusion and conflict. For example, suppose that a
corporation incorporated in one state maintains its principal place of business
in another state and operates assembly and manufacturing plants in still
other states. If a minimum-contacts standard controlled jurisdiction for
eminent domain, each state containing a plant theoretically would be able
to compel the entire corporation to locate within its borders, just as each
state can force a corporation to appear for suits involving injuries at a plant
within its territory. The manufacturing plant in each state would supply the
minimum contact necessary for condemnation of the whole. The entire
corporation could thus be subject to several condemnation actions, each
state having a valid claim. A race to the courthouse might prove decisive,
since the jurisdiction of the first to file would determine not merely the
forum, but the outcome as well. A rule that fostered this result might en-
courage states to condemn unnecessarily and in haste as a strategic measure
to prevent other states from doing the same.
The minimum-contacts standard could disrupt organized sports competi-
tion if the standard were applied to eminent domain. For example, if a
sports franchise owned training facilities in several states, each state might
claim the franchise, based on the ownership of the real property. This is
85. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 2.12. In addition to strictures on their taking and taxing
powers, states have been restrained under the commerce clause from the extraterritorial exercise
of their regulatory powers. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), the Supreme Court
struck down a Nebraska statute which restricted the export of Nebraska groundwater, holding
that groundwater was an article of commerce. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982),
the Court found that the Illinois Business Takeover Act imposed a burden on interstate
commerce. The message from the Court is clear: extraterritorial exercise of governmental powers
is not permitted. The law of eminent domain requires clear rules for locating property which
will determine whether the condemnor is exercising its power within its jurisdiction.
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the argument advanced by the City of Baltimore. Carrying the hypothetical
a bit further, if a team merely appeared in another jurisdiction to play a
game, those minimum contacts might give that state a claim to the whole
franchise. Once the minimum-contacts standard is adopted for condemnation
jurisdiction, very few contacts would be excluded from the reach of the
condemnor.
A minimum-contacts test for eminent domain would result in multiple
claims to the same property based on past or present ownership. The con-
demnee, distressed at the thought of one condemnor, would now face the
prospect of defending against many. The claim of the City of Baltimore is
defective in that it relies on contacts made by the franchise before the City
filed suit. If such an argument could prevail in eminent domain, any property
owner who moved from one state to another would continue to risk con-
demnation by the original jurisdiction because of the past location of his
property within the former state. Such a result is inconsistent with cases
holding that a new domicile is established the moment an individual arrives
at another place with the intention of making it his home. 86 As soon as a
new domicile is established, a time-line must be drawn as a barrier against
condemnation by the previous sovereign. The standard for judicial jurisdic-
tion does not provide for such a barrier and thus is not appropriate for
eminent domain. Since the power to condemn rests on a "best contacts"
theory, a minimum-contacts test cannot apply.87
V. ESCHEAT: JURISDICTIONAL MODEL FOR EMINENT DOMAIN
Of all the powers of a sovereign state, the power to escheat88 may bear
the closest resemblance to the power of eminent domain. Like the power to
condemn, the power to escheat is exclusive. Since "the same property cannot
constitutionally be escheated by more than one State," the contacts of the
victorious state must be "superior to all others." 8 9 Escheat also resembles
eminent domain because the property must be within the jurisdiction at the
time the action is filed. In escheat location within the jurisdiction is presumed
since a number of years must pass before the sovereign can act to acquire
unclaimed property within its territory 0 The problem encountered by
the Supreme Court in dealing with the escheat of intangible property is
86. See, e.g., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116 (6th
Cir. 1973); Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962).
87. Cf. Justice Brennan's concurring and dissenting opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner. Justice
Brennan did not think it unfair for appellants to make themselves available for suit in Delaware,
because, for judicial jurisdiction the Court was concerned with " 'minimum' contacts, not the
'best' contacts." 433 U.S. at 228.
88. Escheat is "a procedure.., whereby a sovereign may acquire title to abandoned property
if after a number of years no rightful owner appears." Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674,
675 (1965).
89. Id. at 678-79.
90. See id. at 675.
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similar to the current uncertainty regarding intangibles in eminent domain.
In resolving the escheat controversy, the Court sought a "clear rule" for
"all types of intangible obligations ... to which all States may refer with
confidence." 9' Escheat offers guidance for intangibles in eminent domain.
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 92 the Supreme Court pre-
pared the way for a definitive rule in escheat but refrained from developing one.
Western Union held only that a state court lacked the jurisdiction to ad-
judicate escheat controversies when more than one state had potential claims
against intangible property.93 In its decision regarding the proper forum for
such disputes, the Court emphasized the magnitude of the escheat problem,
noting that state escheat laws had originally applied to real and tangible
property but were being drafted with greater frequency to target "the elusive
and wide-ranging field of intangible transactions. ' 94 Such applications pre-
sented problems of great importance to the states as well as to those persons
whose rights would be adversely affected through escheat procedures. 95
The Court's description in Western Union of the increasing problems with
intangibles mirrors the current trend in eminent domain. Condemnation has
been aimed primarily at real and tangible property. Owners received com-
pensation for intangible property because it was usually a secondary asset
destroyed in the primary taking. 96 As between states, real and tangible
property are rarely problematical: "[n]o case of a state openly attempting
to condemn land within another state against the will of the latter has arisen
or is likely to arise . . . . -97 When a state such as Maryland, however,
viewing with disfavor the movement of a valuable business from its territory,
enacts legislation aimed directly at intangible property, uncertainty in the
law prevails. Since the capacity of intangibles to associate with several states
at once is unlike the stationary qualitiy of real and tangible property, enabling
legislation poses the same problem for condemnation as it did for escheat.
In both cases, more than one state may possess valid claims to the same
property.
In Western Union, the Court left for a future time "the difficult legal
questions presented when many different States claim power to escheat
intangibles . . .-. "98 Despite its avoidance of substantive escheat issues, the
Court revealed, through its jurisdictional analysis, why the power to escheat
91. Id. at 678.
92. 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
93. See id. at 79.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848); see also supra note
31.
97. 1 NicHoLs, supra note 7, § 2.12. However, "the courts have had to construe statutes,
authorizing in general terms the condemnation of interstate bridges, as giving no power to take
that part of the bridge lying beyond the boundary of the state in which the statute was enacted."
Id.
98. Western Union, 368 U.S. at 80.
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was exclusive and why a definitive rule for intangibles was necessary. "[W]hen
a state court's jurisdiction purports to be based ... on the presence of
property within the State, the holder of such property is deprived of due
process of law if he is compelled to relinquish it without assurance that he
will not be held liable again in another jurisdiction . . . ."9 If a second
state, not a party to the first suit, escheated the same property, the owner
would be subject to multiple liabilities since the second state is not bound
by the first state's decision.2° In the absence of a predictable rule, intangible
property having connections with more than one state, carries with it the
risk of conflicting judgments.
In Texas v. New Jersey,'0' four states asserted actual, competing claims
to the same intangible property, forcing the Court to resolve the troublesome
issues it had encountered in Western Union. 0 2 Each state based its jurisdiction
to escheat on a particular type of contact with the targeted property. The
Court began its analysis, as it had in the taxation cases, with the rule for
tangibles. For this type of property, real or personal, "only the State in
which the property is located may escheat."'' 3 The Court then proceeded to
the issue of jurisdiction over intangibles, with the familiar observation that
such property caused difficulties because it was "not physical matter which
[could] be located on a map."'04 In considering the arguments of all four
contenders, the Court observed that since the states were separately without
constitutional power to settle the controversy, and no federal statute existed
to provide a remedy, the Court would adopt a rule which would finally
settle the issue.1°s
The Court readily disposed of the minimum-contacts argument as un-
suitable, stating that "[tihe 'contacts' test as applied in this field is not really
any workable test at all-it is simply a phrase suggesting that this Court
should examine the circumstances surrounding each particular item of es-
cheatable property .... 06 Such a test would not be appropriate for a
jurisdictional power which requires exclusivity. 0 7 After weighing the re-
maining arguments, the Court chose one based on "a variation of the old
99. Id. at 75.
100. Id.
101. 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
102. The property in Texas v. New Jersey consisted of:
various small debts totaling $26,461.65 which the Sun Oil Company for periods
of approximately seven to 40 years prior to the bringing of this action has owed
to approximately 1,730 small creditors who have never appeared to collect them.
The amounts owed, most of them resulting from failure of creditors to claim or
cash checks, are either evidenced on the books of Sun's two Texas offices or are
owing to persons whose last known address was in Texas, or both.
Id. at 675.
103. Id. at 677.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 679.
107. See id. at 678-79.
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concept of mobilia sequuntur personam,' '0 8 holding that the intangibles in
question were "subject to escheat only by the State of the last known address
of the creditor. ... ," 09 The Court agreed that for escheat, "[s]uch a solution
would be in line with one group of cases dealing with intangible property
for other purposes in other areas of the law."" 0 The elimination of a
minimum-contacts standard for escheat comports with the reasoning in the
preceding section regarding the unsuitability of such a test for condemna-
tion."' The Court's adoption of an escheat rule relying on the address of
the creditor also supports the conclusion reached earlier in this Note that
the same rule should apply to eminent domain." 2
In conferring the power to escheat intangibles on the jurisdiction of the
last known address of the creditor, the Court presumes, as it did in taxation,
that the owner is capable of exerting immediate control over the property.
In taxation, the domicile of the owner supplies the closest approximation
of the location of intangible property. In escheat, not only is the situs of
the property unknown, but the location of the owner (creditor) is undeter-
minable as well. The Court extended its reasoning one step further. For lack
of a closer connection between the state, the owner and his property, the
Court resorted to the last known address of the owner as the next best thing
to the owner himself.
The Court acknowledged that the case for escheat could have been resolved
otherwise, as neither constitutional nor statutory provisions were control-
ling. 13 Nor was the decision "entirely one of logic. '" 4 Ease of administration
and fairness are the principal benefits of the rule.' The rule "involves a
factual issue simple and easy to resolve, and leaves no legal issue to be
decided."" 6 The Court believed that in the long run the rule would be the
one most generally acceptable to all the states.' 7
The decisions of the Supreme Court suggest that the rule of mobilia
sequuntur personam is suitable for intangible property in tax and escheat
law. This Note suggests that the same rule should apply to intangibles in
eminent domain. The rule locating an intangible at the domicile of the owner
is predictable, involves simple issues of fact, is in line with previous reasoning,
and is considered to be equitable. It is not fraught with the confusion of a
minimum-contacts test. It offers a solution, with few administrative diffi-
culties, in an area which is devoid of precedent. In conjunction with the
108. Id. at 680-81 & n.10. This was how the Court characterized the solution advanced by
the State of Florida.
109. Id. at 681-82.
110. Id. at 681 & n.12.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
113. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 683.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 681.
117. Id. at 683.
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rule for realty and tangibles, which confers jurisdiction where such property
is found, the proposed rule for intangibles will provide a measure of certainty
in eminent domain.
In the case of an individual, only one designated domicile is permitted." 8
Once the property owner's domicile is established through a factual deter-
mination, the issue of condemnation jurisdiction can be promptly settled.
In the case of many corporations, however, no similar domiciliary rule exists.
Additional steps are thus required before the domicile of the owner can be
identified.
VI. CORPORATE DoMICILE FOR EINmENT DOMAIN:
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BusINESS
The ease' of applying the proposed rule of mobilia sequuntur personam
to individuals belies the greater difficulty in administering it to corporations.
Two additional determinations are necessary to tailor the rule to these busi-
ness enterprises. First, the issue of corporate ownership needs clarification.
Second, the issue of domicile must be resolved. Unlike an individual, a
corporation can be in several places at once. A proposed rule must designate
the most appropriate place as the corporate domicile for eminent domain.
A corporation has a dual identity with regard to corporate ownership. In
one sense, the corporation owns the corporate property; yet in another sense,
the corporation is the corporate property. The general rule applicable to
creditors of a corporation is that the corporation itself, as opposed to the
shareholders, is the owner of all corporate property." 9 Because a condemnor
is in a position similar to that of a corporate creditor, 20 the general rule
should control. The corporation itself should be considered the "owner" of
the intangible corporate entity. Once the corporation is deemed to be the
owner, the only remaining question is where that owner is domiciled for the
purposes of eminent domain.
The corporate penchant for associating with more than one jurisdiction
causes trouble in designating a corporate domicile. One source has suggested
that no useful purpose is served by attributing a single domicile to a cor-
poration.' 2' Normally, this suggestion is correct. The jurisdictional powers
most often exercised over corporations are not exclusive and are unimpaired
by multiple corporate contacts.'22 Eminent domain demands otherwise. The
exclusive nature of its jurisdiction requires that a corporation, like an in-
dividual, have only one domicile.Y2
118. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
119. H. HENN, supra note 68, at 254.
120. "Corporate creditors may enforce their claims against corporate property." Id. at 254.
This is similar to what a condemnor attempts to do through eminent domain.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 comment 1 (1971).
122. E.g., taxation, judicial jurisdiction and regulation.
123. Allowing the establishment of more than one corporate domicile would be tantamount
to permitting more than one state to condemn the same intangible property. The exclusive
jurisdiction of eminent domain precludes both situations.
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One choice for the designated corporate domicile is the jurisdiction of
incorporation. This alternative does not always result in the assignment of
a single domicile, since a business may incorporate in more than one state.
It is an impractical choice because, as between two states of incorporation,
no good criteria can be advanced for favoring one state as a domicile over
the other. In taxation and in escheat, the Supreme Court has suggested the
state of incorporation is too minor a factor. 24 The jurisdiction of incor-
poration does not manifest as strong a nexus with the corporation as some
other location might provide.
Another, more suitable choice, is the corporation's principal place of
business. Difficulties do exist in applying this alternative; but, as none of
the choices for corporate domicile can guarantee a single location, the prin-
cipal place of business is the best choice under the circumstances. The
Supreme Court has said that the state where a corporation's principal place
of business is located "is probably foremost in giving the benefits of its
economy and laws to the company. ... ," '2 For this reason, a corporation's
principal place of business may be the most equitable designation for cor-
porate domicile. Since a principal place of business connotes a site which is
the center of corporate activity, that location would seem to be the closest
approximation of a corporation's true essence. The problem with such a
designation is that deciding where a company's principal place of business
is located may require additional inquiry,126 which the Court believed might
be burdensome. 27 If a court must inquire further, as it might in the current
case, a test to decide the domicile may be helpful.
The same factors used in determining an individual's domicile can, with
slight modification, be used to ascertain the corporate domicile for eminent
domain. In Texas v. Florida, 128 the Supreme Court listed criteria for deter-
mining whether a dwelling place was a person's domicile:
1. Its physical characteristics;
2. The time he spends therein;
3. The things he does therin;
4. The persons and things therein;
5. His mental attitude towards the place;
124. "[I]t would too greatly exalt a minor factor to permit escheat of obligations incurred
all over the country by the State in which the debtor happened to incorporate itself." Texas
v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. at 680. "To attribute to .. .the chartering State, the credits arising
in the course of the business established in another State, and to deny the latter the power to
tax such credits ... is to make a legal fiction dominate realities .... ." Wheeling Steel Corp.
v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 211 (1936).
125. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. at 680.
126. Id. In escheat, the Court rejected the alternative of principal place of business due to
the fact that the corporation was the debtor, not the creditor.
127. Id.
128. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939). Texas sued Florida, New York and Massachusetts
to determine the domicile of the decedent as a basis for levying an inheritance tax.
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6. His intention when absent to return to the place;
7. Elements of other dwelling-places of the person concerned.'1
A determination as to whether a location serves as the principal place of
business, and thus, as the domicile, can be reached by adapting the above
factors to corporations. The case of the Colts illustrates the use of these
criteria. The corporation claims that at the time of the condemnation suit,
it had established offices within Indiana and had moved all of the equipment
necessary for the transaction of franchise business to the new location. 30
The time spent at the new situs was brief; yet the telephones, office equip-
ment, clerical and administrative help, and front-office personnel were in
place in Indianapolis before the condemnation suit was filed in Maryland.,3'
The Colts also maintain that the legal and financial business, as well as the
football business of the franchise, was being transacted from Indianapolis. 13 2
These facts tend to show that, as regarding the "physical characteristics,"
"the things [done] therein," and the "persons and things therein," the Colts
had made Indianapolis their new home.
The corporation's "mental attitude" toward Indianapolis, as evidenced
by the speed and purposefulness of the move, clearly shows the intent to
relocate there. Intent is also supported by the claim that on March 29, 1984,
the corporation attempted to withdraw its qualification to do business in
Maryland, but was met by a refusal from the Maryland Department of
Assessments to file the withdrawal.'33 The "intention when absent to return,"
would seem to refer to temporary absences. Regarding the length of time
spent at a domicile, the Court has held that, "[tihe fact that a stay in a
state is not for long is not necessarily fatal to the existence of a domicil[e].' ' 34
"The essential fact that raises a change of abode *to a change of domicil[e]
is the absence of any intention to live elsewhere."' 35 Relocation at some
future date would not be precluded as long as an intention existed to remain
in the state at the present time. If the current sellout for home games is
any evidence of intent to remain in Indiana, the Colts seem to possess the
present intent to stay within the state.
The last criterion, that of "elements of other dwelling places," is not as
difficult to determine for the Colts as it might be for another corporation,
because at the time of the move the team had ceased using the real property
in Maryland as a training facility. 36 Since then, the Colts' ownership of the
realty has been passive and does not involve the type of daily executive
129. Id. at 413-14.
130. Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 20, at 8-9.
131. Declaration of Michael Chernoff at 4, Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Mayor of
Baltimore, No. B84-1294 (D. Md. filed June 21, 1984).
132. Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 20, at 10.
133. Id. at 10 & n.5.
134. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 n.9 (1942).
135. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914).
136. Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 20, at 9.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
activity that is being performed in Indianapolis.'37 In comparing two sites
for a choice of domicile, an active location should prevail over a passive
one. Because of the active nature of the business organization at the Colts'
new site, the designation of the corporation's domicile should be the Indiana
location.
As noted earlier, a new domicile is established as soon as the intent to
dwell at the new place coincides with the physical presence. 3 ' The party
asserting the relocation "carries the burden of showing that the earlier
domicile was abandoned in favor of a later one."' 3 9 Since corporate presence
within a state is evidenced by the activities of those that act on its behalf,
those in charge of the Colts would seem to have met their burden of proof.
The domicile test for individuals, as applied to this corporation, indicates
that the Colts established their principal place of business in Indianapolis
before the action of condemnation.
The foregoing analysis works against the City of Baltimore. Through the
rule of mobilia sequuntur personam, intangible property is located at the
domicile of the owner. For the purposes of eminent domain, the corporation
is the owner of the intangible corporate entity. By a test to determine domicile,
the corporation-owner is deemed outside the City's jurisdiction at the time
the suit was filed. The City is thus powerless to compel the Colts' return.
It may, through the rule for realty and tangible property, condemn the sports
facility still within its jurisdiction. The realty alone, however, cannot serve
as the basis for the condemnation of the intangible whole.
CONCLUSION
At the present time, the treatment of intangibles in the law of eminent
domain is uncertain. Since this type of property has no physical situs, the
issue of whether it is within a specific sovereign's jurisdiction is difficult to
resolve. As more states exercise their powers of condemnation to prevent
valuable business enterprises from leaving their jurisdictions, clear guidelines
are needed upon which all parties can depend.
The application of a minimum-contacts test to intangibles in eminent
domain is not a practical solution to the problem. Such a standard merely
adds to the current confusion without supplying any corresponding benefits.
The use of escheat as a model, however, coupled with principles of taxation,
affords substantial guidance for a rule in eminent domain.
The rule of mobilia sequuntur personam, which locates intangible property
at the domicile of the owner, should be applied to intangibles in eminent
domain. The rule recognizes that the owner may exert immediate control
over this property by taking it with him when he leaves the jurisdiction.
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Together with the rule for realty and tangibles, which subjects those types
of property to the jurisdiction of the situs, the rule of mobilia sequuntur
personam for intangible property provides a workable standard for eminent
domain.
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